Introduction
Engraved within the pedestal of the Statue of Liberty in New York Harbor, Emma Lazarus' sonnet expresses both the idea that conventional economic "pull" factors (e.g., income per capita) determine migration flows into a country as also the more romantic notion that potential emigrants are "yearning to breathe free"; that they will leave their homelands in search of liberty. Economists are not known to be particularly romantic. They are more likely to express Lazarus' notion in terms of emigrant self-selection according to institutional preferences.
Only a handful of studies explore the role of self-selection according to institutional quality in determining international migration (e.g., Karemara et al., 2000; Vogler and Rotte, 2000; Melkumia, 2006; Bertocchi and Strozzi, 2008; Ariu et al., 2014; Poprawe, 2015) .
However, there are good reasons to think that improvements in institutional quality are an important pull factor. Freedoms may be intrinsically valued as an input to subject well-being (e.g., Stiglitz et al., 2009) , and studies have documented that they are positively associated with individuals' self-reported happiness even after controlling for income (Ovaska and Takashima, 2006; Gehring, 2013; Nikolaev, 2014; Nikolova and Graham, 2015) .
In this paper we ask whether economic and political freedoms of potential destinations relative to origins are significant determinants of migration decisions. We employ crosscountry data on up to 3,566 bilateral migration flows from 77 countries during the 1990 to 2000 period. We relate these flows to measures of institutional quality in potential destinations relative to origin countries. We use the Polity IV (Marshall and Jaggars, 2010) and checks and balances (Keefer and Stasavage, 2003) measures of political institutions, and 4 the Fraser Institute´s Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) index as a measure of economic institutions (Gwartney et al., 2014) . Our results are consistent with those of Ashby (2010) . Furthermore, they are based on a substantially larger sample that includes migration flows from non-OECD countries to other non-OECD countries. The larger sample allows us to report separate effects for destinationorigin differential in each of the EFW index's constituent areas. We report that migrants are attracted to destinations with sounder currencies, less burdensome regulations, and stronger property rights and legal systems. The estimated effect on the latter EFW area (property rights and legal systems) is particularly large.
We also report results for college-educated and non-college-educated subsamples. In doing so, we ask whether differentials in institutional quality are contribute importantly to "brain drain" vis-á-vis more conventional pull factors such as income differentials. Outflows of human capital can directly lead to lower productivity in an origin country; also indirectly if the economy's ability to innovate and adopt new technologies is decreased (Marchiori et al., 2013) . 2 However, we report that greater economic freedom appears to be equally attractive to non-college-educated and college-educated migrants. Furthermore, controlling for economic freedom, the destination-origin income differential has a considerably larger estimated effect on college-educated migration.
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This paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we discuss our contribution in relation to existing literature. We discuss our empirical model and the data that we employ to estimate it in section 3. In section 4 we report our results and then concluding comments are the stuff of section 5.
Our Contribution and the Existing Literature
Only a handful of previous papers empirically examine emigrant self-selection according to institutional preferences. Karemara et al. (2000) and Melkumia (2006) report that measures of civil and economic freedom, respectively, in an origin country negatively predict emigration to the US. Vogler and Rotte (2000) report a similar result based on a measure of political freedom and migration from 86 Asian and African countries to Germany. 3 Ariu et al. (2014) and Poprawe et al. (2015) examine differences in the quality of governance and corruption in relation to migration flows. Finally, papers by Bang and Mitra (2011) , Baudassé and Baziller (2014) , Naghsh Nejad (2013), Ferrant and Tuccio (2013) , and Naghsh-Nejad and Young (2015) assess the role of women's rights provisions in determining, specifically, female migration flows.
The paper closest to the present study is Ashby (2010) 4 We extend and improve upon Ashby's study in a number of ways. First, we examine a cross-section of bilateral migration flows for up to 77 countries over a ten-year period (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) . This is a larger sample of countries and, more importantly, examining migration flows is preferable. Fourth, in all of our estimations we control for "multilateral resistance", i.e., the influence of alternative destinations on migration to a particular destination Fernández-Huertas Moraga, 2012 & . When the influence of alternative destinations is ignored, the result can be to overestimate the importance of other observable characteristics Finally, we estimate the effects of economic and political freedom on, separately, college-educated and non-college-educated migration flows. Positive selection of high-skilled 8 emigrants is well documented and questions regarding the determinants of "brain drain" are critical for developing economies. Brain drain negatively impacts an economy's ability to innovate and adopt new technologies (Marchiori et al., 2013) . 6 Selection of high-skilled migrants may be based on factors such as distance from origin, former colonial relationships, inequality in the origin, and cultural and linguistic proximity (Docquier, 2006; Brückner and Defoort, 2009; Belot and Hatton, 2013) . Importantly, high-skilled, more educated individuals may have better information about the institutional quality of potential destinations. They also may be better able to reckon ex ante the value that they will place on them ex post.
While we study the effect of institutional quality on migration decisions, those decisions may have important effects on the likelihood of institutional change in the origins . When an origin's institutions are misaligned with its citizens' preferences, those individuals can choose to exercise either their voice or their exit option (Hirschman, 1970 (Hirschman, , 1990 ). In the case of the former, individuals seek to affect institutional change in their origins. Alternatively, individuals can exit and migrate to a different country with institutions aligned more closely to their preferences. On the one hand, exiting is a substitute for institutional change in the home country. On the other hand, exiting may also put individuals in an institutional setting where they are more able to express their dissatisfaction with origin institutions and lobby for change. Docquier et al. (2014) indeed find that emigration is associated with increases in the political and economic freedoms available in the origin country. Relatedly, Lodigliani and Salamore (2012) report that total immigration to destinations with greater political empowerment of women is associated with greater political participation of women in the origin country. 
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The above-cited studies are interesting in their own right and also raise concerns for endogeneity in our own study. To alleviate endogeneity concerns in general, we control for three types of fixed effects (origin, destination, and origin interacted with nest). In regards to reverse causation in particular, the above-cited studies suggest that migration positively affects origin institutional quality. Furthermore, other researchers have suggested that migration negatively affects destination institutional quality, especially when migration comes from lower institutional quality origins (e.g., Borjas, 2014 Borjas, & 2015 Collier, 2013) . 8 If these suggestions are accurate, then they will bias our results against finding that destination relative institutional quality is a positive determinant of migration.
Empirical Model and Data
We estimate gravity models of the forms,
Migrationijs is the bilateral migration flow from origin i to destination j of individuals of education level s. In the context of our data, s will correspond to all (or total), collegeeducated, or non-college educated. i, j, and i*n are origin, country, and origin-nest interaction fixed effects. (The "nests" will be defined below.) The error term is ij.
A bilateral migration flow is measured as,
These observations are net flows over the 1990-2000 period. All migration data comes from the data set described by Docquier et al. (2009) . Note that we do not scale migration flows by origin population. This is standard in the literature; fixed effects capture the population 8 Clark et al. (2015) , alternatively, present evidence from cross-country data that migration is associated with, at best, positive impacts on destination economic freedom and, at worst, no negative impacts. alternatively, is based on data from the Database of Political Institutions (DPI) (Beck et al., 2010) on the number of "veto players" (i.e., decision-makers whose agreement is necessary for a policy change to occur) that exist in a country's political system. A higher checks and balances score corresponds, like Polity IV, to greater restraint on government.
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The Economic Freedom of the World index is constructed on five equally weighted components: (i) government size, (ii) legal structure and property rights, (iii) access to sound money, (iv) the freedom to trade internationally, and (v) the regulation of markets. This measure is a comprehensive indicator of the quality of economic institutions and policies. 9 We adjust the scale to 1 to 11 to avoid undefined values of the institutional gap, (3). 10 There are alternative measures of institutional quality that we could explore -for example, the World Bank's World Governance Indicators (which are employed in the studies by Ariu et al. (2014) and Poprawe (2015) . However, in this study we are interested in the role of freedoms -economic and political; rather than the quality of governance -in determining migration decisions. 
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Numerous studies have documented a positive correlation between economic freedom and economic growth in cross-country data (e.g., Ayal and Karras,1998; Dawson, 1998; Gwartney et al., 1999; de Haan and Sturm, 2000; Heckelman and Stroup, 2000; Young and Sheehan, 2014) . 11 Economic freedom is scored, for each country, on a scale of 0 to 10, with 10 indicating institutions that are most conducive to individual choice, competitive markets with free entry, and security in one's private property and person.
The vector Z ij in (1) contains our other origin-destination specific controls, and also various fixed effects (discussed below). Regarding origin-destination specific controls, we follow Mayer and Zignago (2011) and include a contiguity dummy to capture the effect of being geographic neighbors. We also control for the bilateral (log) distance between country pairs 12 . We also include a colonial link dummy that takes the value of 1 for country pairs that have a past colonial relationship. Colonial relationships can imply similar cultures and other institutions, which may be associated with lower migration costs. Empirically, former colonizers tend to have particularly high migrant stocks from their former colonies. In a similar spirit, we include a common language dummy that takes a value of 1 if 20% or more of the origin and destination populations speak the same language; also a common second language dummy that takes the value of 1 if more than 9% but less than 20% of the populations speak the same language. Additionally, we control for the initial total stock of migrants from i who are in j are the start of the migration flow period. This stock is included to control for the positive effect that a pre-existing network of migrants from an origin can have on subsequent migration decisions of individuals from that origin. Lastly we include the 12 per capita income gap between a destination and an origin country as a control, defined in similar fashion to (4) above. This data is collected from the World Bank. We use 1990 values for these control variables. 
Estimation Methods
The use of two gravity model specifications is motivated by the occurrence of zero value observations for some country pairs. We apply OLS to the gravity model (1). However, when observations of (2) are zero the natural log cannot be taken. This decreases our observations from a maximum of 3,566 to a maximum of 2,246. And zero value observations can be informative. We therefore also employ the Poisson pseudo maximum likelihood method suggested by Silva and Tenreyro (2006) . PPML estimates directly the nonlinear form of a gravity model, incorporating the information contained in the dependent variable observations of zero. 13 Because the PPML method the nonlinear form, the dependent migration flow variable is not logged (unlike the case of OLS).
All of our estimations contain both origin and destination fixed effects. Additionally, we also control for the influence of multilateral resistance. Multilateral resistance refers to a situation where individuals from a particular origin country have migration preferences for a particular group (or nest) of destination countries Fernández-Huertas Moraga, 2012 & . In the presence of multilateral resistance, the cross-section dependence can lead to biased estimates based on either OLS or PPML.
We control for multilateral resistance by following Bertoli and Fernández-Huertas Moraga (2012) . They suggest including, in addition to origin and destination fixed effects, origin-nest fixed effects. The inclusion of these origin nest dummies satisfies the cross dependence requirement for PPML estimation. Intuitively, when we observe migration to a particular destination from a particular origin, we want to control for the fact that individuals in that origin may have, all else equal, a preference for migrating to a group of destination that includes that particular one. We define a group of six "nests": (i) Asia, (ii) Middle East, 13 Moreover, Silva and Tenreyro (2006) argue that the log-linearization of the traditional gravity model is likely to introduce heteroscedasticity and lead to bias estimates. PPML estimation of (2) is more consistent with the assumptions of the underlying random utility maximization model (Borjas, 1987) and less likely to introduce heteroscedasticity and bias.
(iii) Latin America, (iv) Sub-Saharan Africa, (v) Western Democracies, and (vi) Eastern
Europe. 14 The list of countries included in each of these nests is reported in table 2. Based on these definitions, we report both OLS and PPML results when destination, origin, and originnest fixed effects are all included. Table 3 reports the OLS estimation results for (1) total migration, (2) college migration, and Table 4 suggests that for migrants of all education levels destination-origin differentials in economic freedom are significant determinants of bilateral migration flows 18 .
Results
16 Even though PPML estimation does not use the log of the migration flow as the dependent variable (so that observations with value of zero can be utilized) the coefficients can be interpreted similarly to those of the OLS estimation because PPML is based on the non-linear form of the gravity model. 17 Income gaps and economic freedom gaps are correlated with one another. (The simple correlation between the two variables in our sample is 0.3938.) This creates a collinearity concern in our estimations. However, while this might inflate the standard error on the income gap estimate it is unclear as to why this would be a particular problem in the non-college migration estimations relative to the college migration estimations. 18 As a robustness check, we include two more tables in the Appendix of this manuscript. Appendix A1, presents the PPML estimations analogus to table 4 with only including non-zero observations. (same observations as the OLS estimations in table 3 ). Tabel A2, shows the result excluding the flows to the United States.
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The EFW index has 5 constituent areas: size of government, legal system and property rights, access to sound money, freedom to trade internationally, and regulation of business, credit, and labor markets. Table 5 reports results for PPML estimations that are analogous to those of table 4 except that the 5 EFW areas are included in the estimations individually. Overall, economic freedom is still significant why the political institutions gaps are not. However, we specifically see that three EFW areas enter significantly into the total, college, and noncollege estimations: property, sound money, and regulation. Furthermore, the largest effects are associated with the legal system and property rights area, and those effects are remarkably similar across the total, college, and non-college subsamples (point estimates of 1.550, 1.592, and 1.809, respectively).
We also note that income gap results reported in table 5 are consistent with those from table 4. The point estimate for college is again much larger than that for non-college (42.498 versus 16.772). Again, this is consistent with destination-origin income differentials based largely on returns to human capital.
Concluding Discussion
In this paper we employ data from 77 countries during the 1990-2000 time period to explore emigrant self-selection according to institutional quality. In particular, we ask whether destination-origin differentials in measures of political and/or economic institutional quality are determinants of bilateral migration flows.
Our tentative answer is in line with Ashby's (2010) earlier study. Relative increases in economic freedom are significantly attractive to potential migrants; increases in political freedom, all else equal, not so much. Though we echo Ashby's conclusion along these lines, we demonstrate that the result is robust to a larger sample of countries and examining migration flows over a substantially long (10-year; 1990-2000) period.
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We also ask whether the effects are different for college-educated versus non-college educated migrants. In regards to economic freedom it appears that the answer is: no.
Economic freedom differentials are associated with increased migration in regards to both relatively low-and high-skilled individuals.
While we do not find different effects across educational attainment types, we do find them across the different dimensions of economic freedom. In particular, environments of sound money, low regulation, and property rights secured under the rule-of-law are, all else equal, attractive to potential migrants. The estimated effect of strong property rights is particularly large.
Emma Lazarus famously wrote: "Give me your tired, your poor, Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free [.] " If the Statue of Liberty is selling, our results suggest that the potential migrants of the world are buying. All else equal, our results suggest that migrants look to exit their origins towards destination where they breathe more economically free. 
